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ABSTRACT
The dynamics of warfare have changed from the conventional wars fought on the battlefield to
virtual warfare as states have been involved in the cyber arms race. From simple distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks to the potent Stuxnet and Flame the cyberweapons vary
in their potential human cost. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is drafted flexibly to
adapt to changing circumstances. This paper is primarily based upon the assumption that
existing treaty law is sufficient in many aspects yet in some areas treaty-making is also needed.
What is the foreseeable solution is the comprehensive state practice for interpreting the
existing rules (lex lata) regulating the armed conflict in the cyber context. This is because
armed conflicts in cyberspace differ from kinetic warfare in multiple dimensions. The world
community is yet to reach a consensus on how LOAC protects at times of cyberwarfare. From
defining the basic terms like attack and object to the attribution needs resolution. Given such
ambiguity, international humanitarian law (IHL, interchangeably used with LOAC) will more
frequently be violated in conflicts occurring in cyberspace than in physical space. Efforts by
states in sincere exploitation of existing laws are the sine qua non for the evolution of IHL in
the cyber context.
Keywords: international humanitarian law, cyberwarfare, cyberattack, data, attribution,
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict
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1.

INTRODUCTION

A sword never kills anybody: it is a
tool in the killer’s hand.
(Lucius A. Seneca)
International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
consists of a body of rules, both conventional
and customary, that regulates the conduct
of belligerents during an armed conflict by
prohibiting the use of certain methods means
of warfare. The term war is deliberately omitted for a war-like situation might exist even
when there is no formal declaration of war.
So, to determine the applicability of IHL, it
is quintessential to determine the onset of
an armed conflict. The test for it was laid
down by International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic 1 case
in the following words:
“An armed conflict exists when
states resort to force in their relations inter se or when there is
a protracted armed violence between governmental forces and organized armed groups or between
such groups only.”
The said criterion also implies classifying
armed conflicts broadly into international
armed conflict (IAC) or an armed conflict
not of an international character (NIAC also
termed internal armed conflict). The said
classification is essential for there are different laws applicable to each kind of conflict.
Many of the treaty-based provisions have attained the status of customary norms, and as
such, they bind all states equally2 . However,
1

ICTY, The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision, 2 October 1995,
para 70.
2
The core IHL treaties include the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907; Geneva Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949; the Geneva
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many states are yet to ratify the Additional
Protocols, and the provisions therein are not
customary, and as such, they are binding only
onto the states who have ratified them. The
drafters intended to regulate physical warfare, and the modern warfare mediums like
cyberspace were not known then.
The technological sophistication has enabled States to develop new weapons, and
the law governing the use of such weapons
needs to be exhaustive enough to adapt to
changing circumstances3 (Kathleen, 2006).
Notwithstanding the relatively lesser number
of scenarios where states have acknowledged
the employment of cyber warfare during an
armed conflict, the debate on the legal issues incidental to the conflicts involving cyberspace is high (Gisel, 2020). Cyberwarfare
is referred to as the fifth domain of warfare,
the other conventional domains being the
land, air, sea, and outer space. Cyberspace
offers virtual connectivity independent of territorial limits. With the multiple benefits of
such interconnectivity comes the drawbacks,
such as the users in interface with the network
can easily be targeted where ever they are
(Dinniss, 2008). There is always a possibility
of a bug in the product unknown to manufacturers at the time of release, which the
attacker can exploit for various purposes. For
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, 1949; the Geneva Convention
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
1949; The Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949;
Three Additional Protocols shortened as AP I, APII,
AP III.
3
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I obliges State
Parties to review the legality of employment of any
new weapon at each of the state of the study, development, acquisition and adoption. This is because
the combatants are not given absolute freedom in
choosing means and methods of warfare under article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and Article
35(1) of Additional Protocol I.
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instance, the attacker succeeds in penetrating
the main server of a hospital, and thereby all
the interconnected devices are compromised,
even the pacemaker installed inside the patient’s body. Through command and control
software, the attacker can even break down
the pacemaker’s functioning, which will ultimately result in the patient’s death in the
absence of any backup. So one can speak volumes of the human costs of wired or cyber operations4 . This calls for an in-depth dwelling
into the potential issue that the world would
probably come across in the near future as
all states, from giant economies to the poor
and developing nations, are enhancing their
cyber capabilities.
Cyber operations do not take part in a
legal vacuum as they are becoming part of
modern-day armed conflicts, which demands
the evolutionary interpretation of IHL. This
paper focuses on some significant debates in
the study of IHL in cyberwarfare. Firstly, the
history of cyber-attacks is briefly discussed
to tell readers about the onset of debate. Introducing cyberwarfare is followed by a brief
discussion on how the network functions and
types of attacks based on purposes. The very
terms "attack" and "object" in the cyber
context are analyzed in detail as they form
the basis of every provision of LOAC. The
contemporary debates as to the interpretation of these terms are included in the scope
of the present study. Lastly, the attribution
issue in cyberwarfare is analyzed to introduce
the reader to the difficulty involved in classifying the armed conflict, which is crucial
because there is a different set of rules applicable to each class of armed conflict. The
study ends with the recommendation that
mainly revolves around the need that states
4

For reference see ICRC Report titled “The Potential Human Cost of Cyber Operations” based on
its expert meeting held in Geneva from 14-16 November 2018 explaining the comprehensible devastating
consequences of cyberwarfare.

© 2022 ADFSL

should be more expressive in their practices
concerning cyber warfare as IHL is still in
the budding phase. The need of the hour is
that a new customary norm should emerge,
but states need to put sincere efforts as in
the horizontal hierarchy of sovereign states
law-making power vests in states. The recent
cyberattacks in the ongoing armed conflict
between Russia and Ukraine by the ’patriots’
once again brought the application of IHL to
the limelight.

2. THE ONSET OF
DEBATE ON NEXUS
BETWEEN IHL
CYBERWARFARE
To make the debate better understandable
for the reader, the history of cyber armed
conflict that diverted the attention of international humanitarian law experts is discussed. The very beginning of the twenty-first
century marked the independence of Estonia from the Soviet Union, which had occupied the land since the Second World War.
The Statue (bronze soldier) at the center
of Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, was removed by the Tallinn residents who took the
statute to be the sign of being occupied by
the Soviet Union for nearly half a century
(McGuinness, 2017). This enraged the ethnic
Russians living in Estonia, who started social media campaigns for riots. This marked
the onset of attacks from worldwide on both
government and private cyberinfrastructures
of Estonia. The disruption so caused halted
the normal functioning of the state for some
ten days. Though it was an issue of law
concerning the justification for the use of
force (jus ad bellum) and not IHL, it was
for the first time the world was witnessing
the attacks in a domain not discussed before. In 2008 the debate on the application
of IHL to cyberwarfare started following the
Page 3
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Russo-Georgian war, which is regarded as
"the first case in the history of a coordinated
cyberspace domain attack synchronized with
major combat actions in the other warfighting domains" (David, 2011). These attacks
were more disruptive than destructive (Swanson, 2010). These attacks have played a huge
role in making analysts and scholars think
of the nexus between IHL and attacks in the
cyber domain (Tikk, 2010).
There have been certain international and
national efforts to develop the rules governing
the armed conflicts in cyberspace. The most
significant being the Tallinn Manual compiled
by the twenty individuals in the international
group of experts (IGE) under the auspices
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) and observership of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The
Manual was intended to be based on existing
law (lex lata), and nowhere was it intended
to be referring to an altogether new law (lex
feranda). For this reason, the rules in the
Manual stayed closer to the rules of IHL, a
lex specialis for regulating the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict. However,
the sovereign states have the prerogative of
making binding rules for them either by a
treaty formation or by the consistent and coherent state practices out of the sense of legal
obligation developing a new customary norm.
Manual has only the persuasive value for the
States. Some states, including France, have
come up with laws specifically on the subject
matter beforehand, which is a positive sign
in terms of expression of state practice.
Whenever some grey area in terms of war
comes under discussion, the first provision
that legal minds refer to is the Martens
Clause that was initially the part of the
preamble of Hague Convention II of 1899
and then incorporated as a substantial part
Page 4

in the Geneva law5 and the Hague law6 . The
Martens clause extends the application of international law based on coherent and consistent usages, public conscience, and humanity
to complex cases. The vitality of said clause
is manifested from the fact that it is restated
in modern conventions and has been referred
to by international courts7 and tribunals8 ,
especially where they faced the instances of
legal vacuum (non-liquet), and it has become
part of customary international law9 . The
insertion of this clause primarily made IHL
of an evolving nature capable of dealing with
and adapting to the changing dynamics of
warfare. IHL has undoubtedly filled in the
potential legal gaps by the way it is drafted.
Questions and debates as to the evolution
of "interpretation" of IHL are the tasks of
the states, courts, organizations tasked with
disseminating IHL (primarily ICRC), and
the researchers. As far as cyber warfare is
concerned, the researchers and the non-state
neutral entities have been positively playing
their role, and now it is the states that need
to step up by way of practice or by entering
into an international agreement. The latter
does not seem to be a viable solution as states
do not seem to be willing to be vocal about
the restrictions on their cyber capabilities,
which is improving over time) (Turns, 2012).

5

Article 63 para 4 of GC I; Article 62 para 4 of
GC II; Article 142 para 3 of GC III; Article 158 para
4 of GC IV; Article 1 (2) of AP I Preamble of AP
II.
6
Preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV).
7
For example, ICJ, Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v USA) Merit Judgment of 1986, para.
218.
8
For example, ICTY, The Prosecutor v.
Kupreškić et al [Judgment] 2000, paras. 525-6.
9
ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons [Advisory Opinion] 1996 para. 84.
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3. THE FAULT LINES IN
THE APPLICATION OF
IHL TO CYBERWARFARE
3.1

Interpretation of the term
attack in a cyber context

In the technical sense, cyber warfare refers
to the weaponized use of digital tools employed for the system-to-system attack via
a data stream. The cyber operations based
on purpose can be classified into Computer
Network Exploitation (CNE) and Computer
Network Attack (CNA) (Beck, 2002). The
former refers to data theft without the intent
of damaging the functionality of the system
compromised (access operations). The latter
aims to generate targeted effects on the system, including data tampering by deleting or
altering, disabling the function, or physical
damage to the system (effect operations).
For a cyber operation to constitute a cyberattack for triggering the application of
IHL, the determining factor is the reasonable
expectation of death or injury to persons or
destruction or damage to objects, notwithstanding whether such an operation was offensive or defensive10 . The term attack at this
point needs to be analyzed since it forms the
basis of several general principles and special
prohibitions in terms of the IHL. The prohibitions against indiscriminate attacks, attacks
against civilians, attacks against civilian objects, an attack against medical personnel,
attacks against the natural environment, attacks against dangerous forces, and so on
beg the question of what is meant by "attack" in a cyber context. Article 49 (1) of
Additional Protocol I defines attack in the
following terms:
10

Rule 30 of Tallinn Manual on the International
Law Applicable to Cyberspace.
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“. . . acts of violence against the
adversary, whether in offense or defense.”
So violence is the indicative factor for classifying which military operations could be
called attacks irrespective of the domain in
which such an attack is carried out. For
this reason, psychological cyber operations
do not fall within the meaning of attack for
want of violence11 . Now, these violent attacks should not be restrictively interpreted
to mean only those violent acts that release
kinetic forces. IHL has a consequential-based
approach since every principle is centered on
the central theme of protecting civilians from
the "effects" of conflict to the possible extent. So it is the violent consequences, not
the nature of acts, that determines the scope
of the attack12 . For instance, conventionally
destroying the electric grid system supplying
electricity to the whole city is equivalent in
terms of consequences to the use of cyber operations for causing such destruction. Thus
such cyber operation qualifies as an attack.
As a matter of law, it has been agreed universally that biological and chemical attacks
are in legal sense attacks despite no kinetic
release and was discouraged in its employment as a means of warfare even before the
specific convention was entered into13 . Thus
one can by analogy extend this principle to
cyber warfare.
There is support from several provisions
of Additional Protocol I and the customary
rules to interpret the term violence. It is
agreed among the majority of experts that
11

German Manual, para 474.
In other words IHL is not worried about acts
that are violent or involve the transfer of kinetic
force what IHL cares about are the consequences.
13
In Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal, 1995) paras
120-124 the ICTY decided against the use of chemical
weapons in either forms of armed conflict. Analogically the same is true for the cyberattacks.
12
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the violence must not be de minis which will
not qualify the operation as an attack. The
indicative factors include the excessive death,
destruction, or combination thereof, damage
to the environment that is severe, widespread,
and long-term14 , severe losses arising from the
destruction of critical infrastructure15 . It is
pertinent to mention here that the law forbids
those attacks that can "foreseeably cause"
the required extent of harm. So though the
cyberattack might not have caused the required harm to the system directly targeted
yet, such an attack has the potential of causing more significant harm to the person or
objects, which would be prohibited had the
attack been that of a conventional nature. So
it will be absolute absurdity and irrationality
if one arrives at a different conclusion merely
because the warfare is conducted in a cyber
domain. So, till here, what constitutes cyber
operation has been discussed, which will be
used in defining the term cyber warfare.
In its study on the limitations imposed by
IHL on the cyberattacks, ICRC defined cyber
warfare in the following terms:
“[Cyberwarfare refers to] means and
methods of warfare that consist of
cyber operations amounting to, or
conducted in the context of, an
armed conflict, within the meaning
of IHL (ICRC, 2013).”
The above definition gives two possibilities.
Firstly, if it meets the criteria of armed conflict, a cyber operation in itself can be cyber
warfare. Secondly, if conducted in furtherance of an armed conflict, the cyber operation
can be termed as cyberwarfare.
Moreover, not all the conflicts or attacks
come within the purview of IHL but only the
‘armed conflicts. The terms “resort to armed
14

Article 35 (3) of AP I. The environment is also
specifically protected under article 55 of AP I.
15
Article 56 (1) of AP I.
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force" and “armed conflict" is not expressly
defined in the treaty IHL (Droege, 2012), so
the resort has to be made to jurisprudence to
discover the true meaning and apply it in the
cyber context. Here is a trichotomy of approaches as to the cyber operation amounting
to an armed attack and thereby triggering
the application of IHL. These are the permissive approach, the restrictive approach,
and the functional approach. The underlying idea of the permissive approach is that
the cyber operations not causing the actual
physical destruction are deemed permissible.
This is an over-exclusive interpretation that,
if applied to the potential situations, will defeat the very purpose and spirit of IHL. This
approach opens gates for the mysteries that
will not be resolved had the law been strictly
interpreted even when the surrounding circumstances in which it is to be applied are
evolving. The restrictive approach is based
on the principle of distinction that the military objectives could only be targeted, and
any attack against a civilian object is unlawful. But in the cyber domain, does this principle implies that all the operations against
civilians are unlawful? Which will be analyzed later. The approach adopted by the
majority in the Tallinn manual is called the
functionality approach, whereby damage includes an operation that, albeit not physically
damaging or destructive, affects the functionality of the cyberinfrastructure against which
it is directed. The determining factor here
is whether the infrastructure attacked is prevented from performing its intended function.
If yes, then civilian objects will enjoy the
protection of IHL against the damage arising
therefrom. Though this seems to be a sensible approach, the dispute arises whether the
functioning shall be permanently disrupted
to call such an operation an attack or even
the temporary disruption would cause the operation to fall within the meaning of attack
under IHL.
© 2022 ADFSL
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The disabling of the object in a cyber operation (the functionality approach) finds support in Article 52 of AP I when it talks about
the “neutralization" of objects. If one adopts
the functionality approach, the only cyber
incident that would fulfill an attack requirement was the “Operation Olympic Games.”
The nuclear enrichment facilities were targeted, especially the centrifugal apparatus
installed for the purification of Uranium in
the nuclear facility of Natanz, Iran. Cyber
analysts named the bug developed by the
coalition of the U.S. and Israel as Stuxnet.
From 1000 to 5000 centrifuge machines broke
down, and it was programmed to remain unnoticed even by the cyber security measures
taken in the Natanz nuclear facility. So this
cyber operation affected the functionality of
the devices targeted, and thus this fulfills
the functionality approach of attack. ICRC
views the disability of an object as the sole
criterion for defining the term attack irrespective of whether it is brought by cyber
means or kinetic means, and the writer also
thinks it to be the most suitable approach in
pragmatic terms (ICRC, 2013). The way the
attacks should be interpreted and how such
an approach could be refined depends on the
relevant State practices.

3.2 Interpreting the term
object in cyber context: Is
data an object or not?
Another important area of dispute amongst
legal experts is whether data can be called
an object for attack? Since the very thing
against which a cyber attack is conducted is
data. If it is called an object and a civilian
object, then it will enjoy the protection afforded by IHL to civilian objects, and hacking
would be a war crime. Even in the commentary of the Tallinn Manual, it is expressed
that the views of the IGE were divided. The
majority view was that data could not be
© 2022 ADFSL

interpreted as an object. They based their
view on the ICRC’s commentary on article
52 of Additional Protocol I, which states that
an object is something that is “visible" and
"tangible." Since data is virtual thus, it does
not come within the ordinary meaning of the
term object.
Furthermore, they argued that no expressed state practice suggests that data is
protected as an object. This interpretation
implies that "any" cyber operation against
civilian data will not be an attack against
a civilian object if the functionality of the
infrastructure attacked remains intact. Minorities believe that data is an object and
that any cyber operation against civilian data
is an attack on a civilian object and is thus
prohibited by IHL. They argue that the interpretation should be influenced by the surrounding and evolving circumstances. The
expert calls the former interpretation to be
under-inclusive and the latter interpretation
to be over-inclusive. Here the reference to
the balancing approach adopted by IHL is
relevant. IHL is a body of law that seeks to
balance military necessity and humanitarian
consideration. Those who interpret data as
not an object overemphasize the military necessity. At the same time, the other group
interpreting data as an object overemphasizes
the humanitarian considerations. So in the
true spirit and purposes of IHL, both these
views are not correct. Again States have the
authority of interpreting it, and the States
would be more inclined towards interpreting
data as not an object because they will want
to attack the data during counterinsurgencies to deprive the military of the support of
the civilian population. Still, data is to be
protected based on the functionality test that
the data cannot be manipulated where it will
affect the intended use of the infrastructure
containing such data.
ICRC’s position on this issue is that the
data that enjoy special protection under IHL
Page 7
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have a comprehensive normative framework
(ICRC, 2015). For instance, medical data
is protected because it is "medical" data,
not because it is an object, and IHL provides special protection to the purpose such
data serves. This is especially relevant in
the current backdrop of the pandemic situation. The same is valid for protecting the
humanitarian assistance data not because
it is an object but because of its function,
which enjoys special protection in IHL. The
concern is about that data which is essentially civilian data but does not enjoy special
protection under IHL. The general rules regulating the conduct of hostilities cover the
protection of such data like tax records, bank
accounts, company data, and election records.
If such data is tampered with or deleted, it
can halt the functioning of governmental organizations and private businesses. It might
have the potential of causing harm to civilians greater than that resulting from the destruction of physical objects. Reconciliation
with the underlying purpose (raison detre)
of IHL is impossible if one concludes that
in today’s cyber-reliant world, the operation
against civilian data is not an attack against
a civilian ‘object’ (ICRC, 2016).

3.3

Difficulty of Attribution in
Cyber Context:
Classification of Armed
Conflict in Cyberspace

Suppose a person within the territory of
Japan, at the request of the U.S. government,
compromised the functionality of all the electricity grid stations in Iran, which is engaged
in an armed conflict with France, a staunch
ally of the U.S. This resulted in a complete
electricity blackout in Iran for seven hours
which halted the smooth functioning of all the
sectors of the country with special reference
to health care facilities and critical civilian infrastructure. The attacker is amongst the top
Page 8

cyber experts in the world, and thus, the attack is likely to have been conducted without
leaving behind any clue as to the true origin of the attack. This illustration manifests,
amongst others, one of the biggest concerns
for IHL application to the armed conflicts
in the cyber domain, i.e., the issue of attribution (i.e., identifying the source of the attack and “who did it? Rather more precisely
“who is to blame") for three main reasons.
Firstly, in an ongoing armed conflict, IHL
regulates only those cyber operations which
have a causal link with the ongoing armed
conflict. Establishing that link and determining whether it was conducted in furtherance
of an armed conflict attribution is indispensable. Secondly, IHL has a distinct set of rules
applicable to International Armed Conflicts
(IACs), when two or more states resort to the
use of force and Non-International Armed
Conflicts (NIACs) essentially involve at least
one non-state organized armed group. The
concepts of foreign intervention and NIAC
spillover are linked to it, which the state practices and judicial decisions have settled down.
Until the attacker is not identified, the lack
of attribution would make the classification
of armed conflict impossible, and in turn, the
applicable law would be doubtful. Thirdly,
the accountability for the attack is based on
attribution and identification of the attacker.
Two famous tests govern the attribution
based on state control: the effective control
test and the overall control test. The former
test propounded by ICJ in the Nicaragua
case 16 considers a state responsible for the
acts of non-state actors only when each of
the acts during the conflict were carried out
in furtherance of State-specific instructions.
This legal regime was applied to the 2008
Russo-Georgian War, where the threshold of
16

ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
USA) Merit Judgment of 1986.
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effective control of Russia over alleged perpetrators was not met. The digital forensic
evidence substantiated the coordination of
cyber-attacks with the ongoing armed conflict
in a physical domain which convincingly indicated the involvement of the Kremlin (Russian government). However, Russia called the
attacker Russian patriots on whom the government lacked overall control. This leads to
the claim that the "attribution fixation of the
effective control test is a de facto license for
impunity in the cybersphere" (Healey, 2012).
Hence owing to the difficulty in standards
of proof, the much-celebrated test in judicial
decisions is the less stringent overall control
test laid down by ICTY17 . In the given backdrop of limitations of cyber attribution, the
overall control test is more compatible as
it entails the responsibility onto the states
having a role in organizing, planning, and
coordinating the non-state groups besides
mere financial and logistical support18 . If
this test were applied to the Russo-Georgian
war, there would have been a prima facie
case of Russian responsibility as the available strategic and forensic evidence pointed
towards the Russian influence over the “cyber
patriots" (Assumpcao, 2020).
These attributions are irrespective of the
domain in which they are carried out. However, identifying the perpetrator of the attack
is essential for determining the issue of state
attribution (referring to the example of the
Iranian attack given at the start of the discussion) and determining whether the conflict
is IAC or NIAC. Cyber warfare’s ease in denial of responsibility is likely to appeal to
17

ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1AR 72 [Appeals Chamber Decision, October 2, 1995].
18
Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on Confirmation
of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/06 [January 29, 2007],
para 211; Case Concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia
and Montenegro) ICJ Rep 43 [2007]: para 404.
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states in using it for attacking purposes in
the future. At times in this paper, the rules
applicable to biological, nuclear, and chemical warfare (which are also the new means
and methods of warfare) have been by way
of analogy extended to warfare in the cyber
domain. Nevertheless, biological and chemical warfare attribution is not an issue since
the state exercises monopoly and control over
its nuclear and chemical facilities. The cyber
domain bestows upon attackers the possibility of hiding their identities and carrying out
attacks without the fear of being identified
by defenders. Even the attacker can program
the malware in such a way as to falsify his
identity and to shift responsibility, in the
event defender can locate the attacker, onto
someone who was not even aware of it (false
attribution). So anonymity issue is yet to
be resolved, and such a breakthrough is not
likely to happen in the near future (Jastram,
2011). Currently, threefold assumptions dominate the virtual or cyber attribution issue
(Rid, 2015). The first assumption is the least
optimistic one and thinks internet redesign to
be the only way out for the most intractable
issue (Singer, 2014) of cyber attribution (McConnell, 2020). Most of the legal debate is
posited on this assumption (Waxman, 2011)
(Tsagourias, 2013) (Roscini, 2014). The second assumption is an intermediary approach
and views that depending on the case, the
issue of attribution could be solved by discovering the culprit, or it remains unsolved and
leads merely to obfuscated log files, spoofed
I.P. addresses, or any other dead trail (Healey,
2013). The third assumption is highly optimistic because the attributive evidence is
readily comprehensible, and the only obstacle
is finding out the evidence for which proponents have presented models19 . The determinative factors in practical terms include
19

The famous two models are the Diamond Model
of Intrusion Analysis by Sergio Caltagirone, Andrew
Pendergast and Christopher Betz and The Kill Chain
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findings of digital forensics (technical investigation) and strategic investigation based
on intelligence information, history, and the
knowledge of possible attackers on assessment
of incentive involved (cost-benefit analysis)
(Lin, 2012). This could help in tracing the
attacker for taking further action.
The non-international armed conflict
(NIAC) is “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups
within a State."20 The two requisites, keeping
in view the definition provided in common
article 3 to all G.C.’s and article 1 of AP II,
for a conflict to be NIAC are organized armed
groups and required level of intensity. The
threshold for a NIAC is higher than for IAC
as the mere riots or sporadic acts of violence
are excluded from the scope of NIAC. In Prosecutor v Limaj the ICTY adopted a lenient
approach and deemed the presence of ‘some’
level of organization sufficient for proving the
first requisite21 . This requirement requires a
case-by-case analysis, but some of the indicative factors ICTY looked into in the Limaj
case were: formal hierarchy, order from the
superior, the establishment of headquarters,
disciplinary rules, and recruits. Thus, those
cyber-attacks conducted by an individual sua
sponte are not an armed conflict of either category. Another implication is that merely
the occurrences of cyber-attacks in parallel
may be called collective but are not organized
(such as Estonian attacks). There is a possibility that the individuals tasked with specific
Analysis by Eric M. Hutchins, Michael J. Cloppert
and Rohan M. Amin.
20
Tadic case, para 70; Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (September 2, 1998) para 619;
Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo (Decision on Confirmation of Charges) ICC-01/05-01/08 (June 15, 2006)
para 229. Similar definition is adopted in article 8
(2) (f) of the Statute of International Criminal Court
[the Rome Statute] of 2002.
21
Prosecutor v Limaj (Judgment) ICTY-03-66-T
(November 30, 2005) para 89.

Page 10

responsibilities like looking for vulnerabilities,
programing and designing malware, launching it, and taking defenses against counterattacks arrange in hierarchically organized
form with one assuming the virtual responsible command.
Moreover, it is acknowledged that such an
organization is not necessarily required to
be as sophisticated as is in regular armed
forces; nevertheless, there should be some
organization22 . The lack of interaction in the
physical world cast doubts about the organization of the cyber armed group. This also
raises the problem of maintaining discipline
as the command control, if any, is merely
online. Moreover, the AP II has put in place
an additional requirement of the ability to
comply with the rules of IHL, which though
is not the requirement under common article
3 to all four Geneva Conventions yet it is considered as a ‘convenient criteria’23 and was
applied by ICTY24 in classifying the conflict.
If compliance is necessary for classifying the
conflict as a NIAC, then possibly all virtual
attacks/ operations will be outside the definition of NIAC for want of effective means
for ensuring compliance25 .
The second criteria for a NIAC to be the
protracted armed conflict lack any bright-line
test, yet certain factors support in determin22

ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol III,
para 4663
23
ICRC, Commentary: I Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (J Pictet
(ed.) 1952) 49.
24
Prosecutor v Boskoski (Judgment) ICTY-04-82T (July 10, 2008) para 205.
25
In Prosecutor v Hadzihazanovic (Appeals Chamber Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility) ICTY-01-47-AR72 (July 16, 2003) paras 16–22
the relation between responsible command and command responsibility was discussed and it was held
that where the members of group lacked responsible
command then attributing their acts to an individual
will be illogical.
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ing it, like the intensity of the armed conflict
to distinguish it from mere internal disturbances. The high threshold might exclude
several cyber operations from the definition
of NIAC.
States are yet to classify the cyber conflicts, not in furtherance of an ongoing armed
conflict. However, it will undoubtedly pose
serious complex issues in the future. The
writer can see the customary norm evolving
in the near future as the dependency on cyberinfrastructure increases with time and the
states have been developing more disruptive
cyber-attack tools. States, therefore, will act
in a particular way out of the sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris) to tackle the legal
problems incidental to such attacks. IHL in
the cyber context is in the budding phase
and will develop with time.

4.

CONCLUSION

“If the new and frightful weapons
of destruction which are now at the
disposal of the nations seem
destined to abridge the duration of
future wars, it appears likely, on
the other hand, that future battles
will only become more and more
murderous.”
Henry Dunant, A Memory of
Solferino, 1862
The present study attempted to highlight
the basic debates fundamental to IHL in cyber warfare. This is a vast topic, but the
scope was limited to the discussions on the
interpretation of general terms. The paper
has clarified that these debates will continue
until some viable solution is adopted. The
dilemma is that the IHL developed in the
times of conventional warfare when the cyberattack was but fiction. The only way out is
either a new convention specifically devoted
to cyber-armed conflicts or the consistent
© 2022 ADFSL

state practices out of a sense of legal obligation that will develop binding customs on
the subject matter. Even though states are
reluctant in making a norm or entering into
treaty relations, potentially curtailing their
use of cyber weapons, Tallinn Manual is a
hope for the future of IHL in cyberwarfare.
Moreover, states will indulge more and
more in devastating cyber conflicts (as is
the case with autonomous weapons) as they
are involved in the cyber arms race. This
will probably lead to the emergence of a
new norm, but that emergence is nowhere in
the immediate future (maybe it would take
decades). The attacking states will be more
likely to interpret the provisions of the existing law of armed conflict to act as a scapegoat
from any responsibility. For instance, interpreting data not as an object as they are and
will like to continue attacks against civilian
data. Unlike the convention on chemical and
biological weapons, cyber weapon treaties,
though best serves the problem, should be
forgotten in the given backdrop of enhanced
military reliance. The need for treaty-making
for a new form of warfare was felt in the aftermath of World War II (the new domain
at that time was airspace), in the words of J.
M. Spaight: “It now remains to show why it
is better to proceed by creating a new and
special code . . . rather than by building
upon and adding to the rules already governing land warfare" (Spaight, 1924). The author guesses that once the state practice has
fully developed, only then would the treatymaking be possible, which will be nothing
but the expression of those norms developed.
However, before any such development, the
rules of IHL should continue to govern the
cyberwarfare and be interpreted in the light
of the values on which IHL is premised.
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